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INTRODUCTION 
An officer illegally stops a man without reasonable suspicion, 
violating his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search 
and seizure.  Based on information gained during this illegal stop, the 
officer searches the man and discovers drugs and paraphernalia.1 
The exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment states that when 
an officer, through his own illegal act, discovers evidence against a 
defendant, such evidence cannot be used against the defendant.2  
Therefore, in the above example, because the officer only found the 
evidence because of an illegal stop, the exclusionary rule should 
prevent the evidence from being used against the man. 
However, in June of 2016, the Supreme Court in Utah v. Strieff 3 
declined to apply the exclusionary rule in the very situation described 
above.4  In this case, after Officer Fackrell stopped defendant Strieff 
without reasonable suspicion, he discovered an outstanding arrest 
warrant in Strieff’s name for a completely unrelated traffic violation.5  
Fackrell then arrested Strieff and conducted a search incident to the 
arrest authorized by the warrant.6  During this search, Fackrell found 
methamphetamines and drug paraphernalia.7  While conceding that 
the original stop was illegal, the Court held that the evidence was 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (holding that evidence was 
admissible under the attenuation doctrine because officer’s conduct was not flagrant). 
 2. See generally Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 3. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 4. Id. at 2064. 
 5. Id. at 2059. 
 6. Id. at 2060. 
 7. Id. (“When Officer Fackrell searched Strieff incident to the arrest, he 
discovered a baggie of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.”). 
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admissible because of an exception to the exclusionary rule known as 
attenuation.8 
Attenuation means that when the causal connection between the 
illegal conduct and the acquisition of evidence is remote or 
“attenuated” enough, the evidence may be admissible.9  The Court 
applies a three-factor test to assess the connection.10  One of these 
factors is “purpose and flagrancy of official misconduct.”11  In Strieff, 
the Court ruled that the evidence was admissible under the 
attenuation exception because the officer’s conduct was not 
flagrant.12  However, the Court never explained how it came to that 
conclusion, nor did it indicate what distinguishes flagrant conduct 
from non-flagrant conduct.13 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct 
by removing the incentive for an officer to conduct an illegal search 
or seizure.14  The Supreme Court has explicitly tied flagrancy to this 
deterrent purpose—the more flagrant a violation is, the greater the 
need to deter that behavior by applying the exclusionary rule.15  
However, without clear articulation of what sets a flagrant violation 
apart from a non-flagrant violation in the context of police 
misconduct, lower courts have no guidance regarding what behavior 
the Court aims to deter by applying the exclusionary rule.16  Further, 
as Justice Kagan explained in her dissent in Utah v. Strieff, the result 
of the majority’s ruling implies that “[t]he officer’s incentive to violate 
the Constitution thus increases: From here on, he sees potential 
advantage in stopping individuals without reasonable suspicion—
exactly the temptation the exclusionary rule is supposed to remove.”17  
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 2064. 
 9. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990) (recognizing rule); Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 
341 (1939). 
 10. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975). 
 11. Id. at 604. 
 12. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
 13. Erwin Chemerinsky, Has the Supreme Court Dealt a Blow to the Fourth 
Amendment?, ABA J. (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
chemerinsky_has_the_supreme_court_dealt_a_blow_to_the_fourth_amendment 
[https://perma.cc/ZGB8-C4L8]. 
 14. See generally Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
 15. Id. at 238 (2011) (“In a line of cases beginning with United States v. 
Leon . . . we also recalibrated our cost-benefit analysis in exclusion cases to focus the 
inquiry on the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue.” (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
 16. Chemerinsky, supra note 13. 
 17. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2074 (Kagan, J. dissenting). 
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Accordingly, even though this case “has received little public 
attention . . . [it] carries enormous implications” regarding the future 
of the exclusionary rule.18 
Part I of this Note will illustrate how the Supreme Court has failed 
to explicitly define flagrancy in the context of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Part II will demonstrate how the lower courts have 
grappled with such lack of a definition.  Part III will define flagrancy 
as an objective measure: an officer’s illegal conduct is flagrant when it 
violates clearly established case law. 
I.  A FAILURE TO DEFINE FLAGRANCY 
The Supreme Court has not clearly articulated what kind of police 
conduct is flagrant in the context of the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule.19  The term most prominently appears in one of the 
exclusionary rule’s exceptions known as the attenuation doctrine.  
Under this doctrine, evidence obtained illegally may be admissible if 
the prosecution can show that the connection between the illegal 
police behavior and the challenged evidence has “become so 
attenuated as to dissipate the taint” of the illegality.20  In assessing 
such connection, the Court evaluates three factors—temporal 
proximity between the illegal conduct and acquisition of evidence, 
any intermediate circumstances between the illegal conduct and 
acquisition of evidence, and the “purpose and flagrancy” of the 
official misconduct.  This Note focuses on the purpose and flagrancy 
factor of the attenuation exception.  However, the analysis of this 
factor has been influenced by another exception to the exclusionary 
rule known as the good faith exception. 
Section I.A will formally introduce the exclusionary rule and give 
an overview of each exception to the rule—good faith, independent 
source, inevitable discovery, and attenuation.  Section I.B will discuss 
issues presented by Herring v. United States, a Supreme Court case 
premised on the good faith exception.  Language from this case has 
since been used to alter the Court’s analysis of the attenuation 
exception’s “purpose and flagrancy” factor.  Section I.C will introduce 
the Court’s most recent application of the attenuation exception—
                                                                                                                 
 18. Julian A. Cook III, The Wrong Decision at the Wrong Time: Utah v. Strieff in 
the Era of Aggressive Policing, 70 SMU L. Rev. 293, 293 (2017). 
 19. Chemerinsky, supra note 13 (“The impact of the decision ultimately will 
depend on how lower courts apply it and how police react to it. As to the former, 
courts will need to face the question of what it means for police conduct to be 
‘flagrant.’”). 
 20. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). 
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Utah v. Strieff—and explore scholars’ concerns with this case’s 
implications for the exclusionary rule in general. 
A. Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence 
The Fourth Amendment aims to protect individuals against 
unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.21  A police 
officer who stops, searches, or arrests someone without the proper 
justification violates that constitutional protection.22  To remedy such 
violations, the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule.23  
Under this rule, evidence of an individual’s guilt that is found as a 
result of a Fourth Amendment violation—such as an unjustified 
search or arrest—cannot be used against that person at trial.24  The 
rule applies both to the direct products of an officer’s illegal act, but 
also to secondary evidence, which is considered “fruit of the 
poisonous tree.”25 
The main rationale underlying the exclusionary rule is that it aims 
to “deter [violations]—to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the 
incentive to disregard it.”26  The Court has recently stated, “the 
exclusionary rule has never been applied except where its deterrence 
benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.”27  Accordingly, the 
Court has delineated four exceptions in which the social costs of the 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67 (1968) (holding that an officer 
violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by stopping him based solely on 
witnessing defendant talk to narcotics addicts). 
 23. See generally Weeks v. United States, U.S. 383 (1914) (mandating application 
of exclusionary rule to federal trials); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (mandating 
that the exclusionary rule applies to the states). 
 24. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
 25. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). 
 26. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 
(1960)); see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (“The rule is calculated to prevent, not to 
repair.”).  The Supreme Court had previously articulated two reasons for application 
of the exclusionary rule—one reason was deterrence, and the other was to promote 
judicial integrity by preventing judges from acting as “accomplices in 
the . . . disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold.” Id. at 223.  
However, since Mapp was decided, the Court has abandoned the judicial integrity 
rationale. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984) (“First, the 
exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the 
errors of judges and magistrates.”). 
 27. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). 
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rule outweigh the potential deterrence benefits.  The first is the good 
faith exception, which is currently premised on analysis of police 
culpability.28  The remaining three exceptions are causation 
limitations to the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine.  The general 
premise of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is that secondary 
evidence—anything discovered as a result of illegally obtained 
primary evidence—is also inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.29  
The three exceptions to this doctrine arise in situations in which the 
government can prove that secondary or derivative evidence is far 
enough removed from the initial illegality that it is not causally tied to 
the illegal police conduct.  These fruit of the poisonous tree 
exceptions are referred to as the independent source exception, the 
inevitable discovery exception, and the attenuation exception.  The 
following subsections provide an overview of the four limitations. 
1. Culpability Limitation: Good Faith 
Originally, the Court established the “good faith” exception in 
United States v. Leon.30  In Leon, the Court held that evidence 
obtained pursuant to a search warrant that is later declared to be 
invalid may be introduced at a defendant’s criminal trial, if a 
reasonably well-trained officer would have believed the warrant was 
valid.31  This standard was entirely objective.32  In Leon, police 
officers executed a facially valid search warrant that led to the 
discovery of evidence, but the warrant was subsequently declared 
invalid due to judicial error.33  While the district court initially 
suppressed the evidence because it was obtained based on a faulty 
warrant, the Supreme Court reasoned that suppression would not 
serve any law enforcement deterrent purpose because the mistake 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trigger the 
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price 
paid by the justice system.  As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to 
deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances 
recurring or systemic negligence.”). 
 29. See generally United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980). 
 30. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 31. Id. at 922. 
 32. An objective standard does not consider the subjective state of mind of the 
officer.  Rather, all actions are compared to what a reasonably well-trained officer 
would have done in similar circumstances. Id. 
 33. Id. at 902 (“A facially valid search warrant was issued in September 1981 by a 
State Superior Court Judge.”). 
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was on the part of the judge, not an officer.34  The Court ruled that 
the officers’ reliance on the warrant was reasonable, and that any 
other reasonably trained officer would have acted similarly.35  
Accordingly, the benefits of deterrence under these circumstances 
were not significant enough to warrant exclusion. 
In 2009, however, Chief Justice John Roberts controversially 
altered this objective analysis of the good faith exception by defining 
the standard in terms of officer culpability.36  In Herring v. United 
States,37 Chief Justice Roberts declared that the exclusionary rule 
only serves to deter “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent 
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.  
The error in this case does not rise to that level [of culpability].”38  
Officers obtained evidence during a search incident to an arrest made 
pursuant to a warrant in the defendant’s name that appeared in a 
computer database.39  This database was later found to be incorrect 
due to a negligent error made by a member of the neighboring 
county’s sheriff’s department.40  Accordingly, the Court had to 
address the novel issue of whether a negligent error by law 
enforcement, rather than a court employee,41 judge,42 or legislature,43 
would change the outcome of the good faith exception.  Ultimately, 
the substantive outcome was the same.  The evidence was admissible 
under the good faith exception.  However, the reasoning was entirely 
different: rather than analyzing the reasonableness of the officers’ 
action in relying on the computer database, Roberts reasoned that the 
neighboring sheriff’s department’s negligent error did not rise to the 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 921 (“Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his 
own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment 
violations.”). 
 35. Id. at 922 (“We conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced 
by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a 
subsequently invalidated warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”); 
see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 360 (1987) (holding that an officer’s illegal 
search was made in good faith because the officer’s belief that his conduct was lawful 
was objectively reasonable, given that the statute he acted under was not declared 
unconstitutional until the next day). 
 36. Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or A Shark?, 
7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 483–84 (2009) (“Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in 
Herring sent objective and subjective pronouncements flying in all directions.”). 
 37. 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 137. 
 40. Id. (“There had, however, been a mistake about the warrant.”). 
 41. See generally Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995). 
 42. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 43. See generally Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
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level of culpability required to warrant suppression.44  As will be 
discussed in Section I.B, this new standard created concerns for the 
exclusionary rule’s future. 
2. Causation Limitation: Independent Source 
The first causation limitation to the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine is the independent source exception.  This exception permits 
the admission of illegally obtained evidence if the government can 
prove the evidence could have been obtained through an independent 
source.45  This exception applies both when the challenged evidence is 
discovered for the first time during lawful police activity and when the 
challenged evidence is initially discovered unlawfully, but is later 
obtained lawfully in a manner independent of the original discovery.46  
The Court justifies this exception by reasoning that while the police 
should not profit from their own misconduct, they also should not be 
made worse off than they were before they committed the 
misconduct.47 
For example, in Murray v. United States,48 the independent source 
exception allowed evidence discovered during an illegal entry to be 
admitted because the officers subsequently obtained a legal warrant 
justifying the entry.49  The officers witnessed the defendant, who was 
already under federal surveillance, and a co-conspirator drive 
separately to a warehouse.50  The officers entered the warehouse 
illegally, without a warrant, and observed bales of marijuana inside.51  
Normally, this evidence would be suppressed under the exclusionary 
rule, because even though they had probable cause, they entered the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 145–46.  Further, Roberts reasoned that “[i]f the 
police ha[d] been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have 
knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion 
would certainly be justified.” Id. at 146. 
 45. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 
 46. See generally Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
 47. Id. at 541–42; Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (“[T]he interest of 
society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries 
receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police 
in the same, not a worse position that they would have been in if not police error or 
misconduct occurred.”). 
 48. 487 U.S. 533 (1988). 
 49. Id. at 542. 
 50. Id. at 535. 
 51. Id. 
2018] FOURTH AMENDMENT FLAGRANCY 807 
warehouse without a warrant.52  However, subsequent to the illegal 
entry, the officers left, obtained a valid warrant based on probable 
cause independent of what they had seen inside the warehouse, and 
then seized the bales of marijuana.53  The Court applied the 
independent source exception, reasoning that even though the bales 
of marijuana were first observed during the illegal entry, they also 
would have been observed had the officers not entered illegally and 
only entered with the valid warrant.54  The warrant served as an 
“independent source.”55 
3. Causation Limitation: Inevitable Discovery 
The second causation limitation to the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine is the inevitable discovery exception.  Under this exception, 
evidence illegally obtained may still be admissible if the prosecution 
can prove such evidence would have been discovered through lawful 
means had the illegal conduct never occurred.56  The logic behind this 
exception is similar to the logic behind the independent source 
exception, in that the courts do not want to put the prosecution in a 
worse position than it otherwise would be had the police’s illegal 
conduct never occurred.57 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (holding that unreasonable 
detention, fingerprinting, and interrogation at police headquarters should result in 
application of exclusionary rule in rape case). 
 53. Murray, 487 U.S. at 536. 
 54. Id. at 541–42. 
 55. See generally id. 
 56. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440–50 (1984). 
 57. Murray, 487 U.S. at 539. (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct 
requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: 
Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an 
independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been 
discovered.”).  This exception was actually established in the context of a Sixth 
Amendment violation. See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).  In Nix, 
officers deliberately violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
elicited incriminating information from him, and induced him to lead them to the 
body of the murder victim. Id. at 431–33.  Even though the violation was a Sixth 
Amendment violation, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies in the same 
manner as it does to Fourth Amendment violations—the body of the murder victim 
was found as the result of the information obtained during the illegal interrogation—
the poisonous tree—and would typically be excluded as tainted fruit. Id.  However, as 
the defendant agreed to lead the police to the body, a separate search team, based on 
information completely independent from what was gathered during the illegal 
interrogation, was within a few miles from the scene.  The team was called off after 
the defendant cooperated. Id.  The Court applied the inevitable discovery exception 
to the body because it would have been discovered “within a short time” “in 
essentially the same condition” as a result of the completely independent search, 
based on separately gained information. Id.  Accordingly, similar to the reasoning of 
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For example, in United States v. Zapata,58 the police illegally 
searched the defendant’s automobile and found cocaine in the 
trunk.59  The First Circuit ruled that because the car was unregistered 
and uninsured, it would have been impounded, and the cocaine would 
have been discovered anyway during an inventory search after 
impounding.60  Thus, suppressing the cocaine evidence would have 
put the government in a worse position than they otherwise would 
have been had the illegal search not occurred.61 
4. Causation Limitation: Attenuation 
The final causation limitation to the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine is the attenuation exception.  In Nardone v. United States,62 
the Court held that evidence secured as the result of police illegality is 
admissible when the causal connection between the illegal conduct 
and the evidence has “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” 
from the original illegal search or seizure.63  The rationale is that 
when the “taint” of the illegal search or seizure is far enough removed 
from the acquisition of evidence, suppression would not likely deter 
future violations of the same type.64 
In Brown v. Illinois,65 the Court articulated a multi-factor 
framework to evaluate whether this exception applies.  The first 
factor examines how much time passed between the officer’s initial 
illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence.66  Generally, when 
little time passes between the illegal act and acquisition of evidence, 
this factor cuts against attenuation.67  The second factor considers 
whether an intermediate circumstance occurred between the initial 
                                                                                                                 
the independent source exception, suppressing the corpse would have put the 
government in a worse place than they otherwise would have been in had the illegal 
interrogation not occurred. Id. 
 58. 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 59. Id. at 974. 
 60. Id. at 978. 
 61. Id. at 979 n.7. 
 62. 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
 63. Id. at 341. 
 64. Mosby v. Senkowski, 470 F.3d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that when 
the causal link between the illegality and subsequently discovered evidence is so long 
or torturous that suppressing the evidence would not deter future similar violations, 
the evidence will be admissible under attenuation). 
 65. 422 U.S. 590 (1975). 
 66. Id. at 603. 
 67. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (“Our precedents have 
declined to find that this factor favors attenuation unless ‘substantial time’ elapses 
between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.”). 
2018] FOURTH AMENDMENT FLAGRANCY 809 
illegality and ultimate discovery of evidence, and whether such 
circumstance was significant enough to attenuate the causal 
relationship between the illegality and evidence.68  When the Court 
finds such intervening circumstances to be present, this factor weighs 
strongly against suppression.69  The third factor—the purpose and 
flagrancy of the police misconduct—is most closely tied to the 
ultimate purpose of the exclusionary rule, to deter police 
misconduct.70 
In Brown, the Court applied these three factors to address whether 
confessions obtained after an illegal search and arrest were 
sufficiently attenuated from the search and arrest.71  Without 
probable cause, the defendant’s home was illegally entered and 
searched, and the defendant was arrested.72  He was taken to the 
station and given Miranda warnings.73  He confessed to murder.74  
About seven hours later, he was given Miranda warnings again, and 
he gave a second confession.75 
The Court analyzed the first two factors in one sentence: “Brown’s 
first statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two 
hours, and there was no intervening event of significance 
whatsoever.”76  However, in analyzing the third factor—the purpose 
and flagrancy of the official misconduct—the Court dedicated a whole 
paragraph: 
The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness.  The 
imporpriety [sic] of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact 
was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly 
acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action 
was “for investigation” or for “questioning.”  The arrest, both in 
design and in execution, was investigatory.  The detectives 
embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that 
something might turn up.  The manner in which Brown’s arrest was 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 2062–63. 
 70. See id. at 2063 (“The exclusionary rule exists to deter police 
misconduct . . . The third factor of the attenuation doctrine reflects that rationale by 
favoring exclusion only when the police misconduct is most in need of deterrence—
that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 71. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975). 
 72. Id. at 592. 
 73. Id. at 594. 
 74. Id. at 594–95. 
 75. Id. at 595. 
 76. Id. at 604. 
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affected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause 
surprise, fright, and confusion.77 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that because these officers 
effected a warrantless arrest without probable cause despite knowing 
they had no legal basis to do so, such conduct constituted the type of 
purposeful and flagrant conduct the exclusionary rule was meant to 
deter.78  In conjunction with the short temporal proximity and the 
lack of intervening circumstances between the illegal arrest and first 
confession, the Court decided that the first confession was not 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest, and because the second 
confession “was clearly the result and the fruit of the first,” the Court 
found it inadmissible.79  However, as the next sections explore, the 
“purpose and flagrancy” factor has not been treated consistently by 
the courts. 
B. A Prelude to Strieff: The Problems Caused by the Herring 
Opinion 
Although the new culpability standard announced by Chief Justice 
Roberts in Herring v. United States was intended to evaluate good 
faith,80 this standard has since been applied by the lower courts in the 
context of attenuation cases.81  An understanding of the general 
problems created by both Herring’s new culpability standard and the 
opinion’s language is necessary before exploring how this standard 
has been applied to the attenuation exception.  This section thus 
outlines concerns scholars have raised regarding the precedent set by 
the Herring opinion. 
1. Contradicts Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Scholars comment that the culpability standard requiring 
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent misconduct for the 
exclusionary rule to apply finds no support in Fourth Amendment 
case law because this standard now requires courts to consider the 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at 605 (internal citations omitted). 
 78. Id. at 605. 
 79. Id. at 604–05. 
 80. See supra Section I.A.1. 
 81. See infra Part II; see also Joëlle Anne Moreno, Flagrant Police Abuse: Why 
Black Lives (Also) Matter to the Fourth Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 36, 
68 (2016) (explaining how the Court has mapped its flagrant police abuse standard 
from Herring to the attenuation exception). 
2018] FOURTH AMENDMENT FLAGRANCY 811 
subjective mental states of police officers.82  However, the Supreme 
Court has specifically stated that courts should not probe the minds of 
police officers.83  The Leon Court “predicted that requiring proof of 
actual (rather than reasonable) police bad faith . . . would ‘send state 
and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of police officers 
[and] would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial 
resources.’”84  Accordingly, the Leon Court cautioned that the “good-
faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question 
whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the 
search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.”85 
However, as Professor Albert Alschuler notes, despite quoting 
Leon’s objective standard and claiming it was applying the same 
deterrence analysis, the Herring Court’s use of the words “reckless” 
and “deliberate” suggests subjective inquiries based on a particular 
police officer’s state of mind rather than on Leon’s ‘reasonably well 
trained officer’ standard.86  Further, Justice Ginsburg highlights this 
contradiction in her dissent in Herring, stating that “[i]t is not clear 
how the Court squares its focus on deliberate conduct with its 
recognition that application of the exclusionary rule does not require 
inquiry into the mental state of the police.”87 
2. Undefined Terms 
Second, some scholars acknowledge that the terms used in the new 
culpability standard for the good faith exception remain undefined in 
the context of the Fourth Amendment.  For example, the term 
recklessness “establishes an objective standard in civil cases and a 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Wayne R. Lafave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s 
Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 763 
(2009) (“But where does the Herring Court find this “culpability” test for 
determining the scope of the exclusionary rule?  It is set out as if a foregone 
conclusion, and is immediately followed with quotations from Leon and Krull, 
suggesting that the notion is well-grounded in existing jurisprudence on the 
exclusionary rule.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 
 84. Joëlle Anne Moreno, Rights, Remedies, and the Quantum and Burden of 
Proof, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 89, 152–53 (2015); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 
(1987) (“As we emphasized in Leon, the standard of reasonableness we adopt is an 
objective one; the standard does not turn on the subjective good faith of individual 
officers.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–20 n.20 (1984). 
 85. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. 
 86. Alschuler, supra note 36, at 485–86. 
 87. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 157 n.7 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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subjective standard in criminal cases,” but it is not clear which 
interpretation of recklessness applies in Herring’s culpability 
standard.88  Similarly, as Professor Wayne LaFave notes, the term 
“gross negligence” is an elusive term that has “left the finest scholars 
puzzled.”89  Further, the Court has never used the term “systemic 
negligence” before.90 
Professor Joëlle Moreno argues that the Herring opinion also 
implicitly gave new meaning to the term “flagrancy.”91  She notes that 
in Herring, the Court stated that “an assessment of the flagrancy of 
the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the [exclusion] 
calculus” under the good faith doctrine.92  Two years after Herring, 
the Court in Davis v. United States 93 adopted this rationale in 
another case premised on the good faith exception.  The Court held 
that suppression in the context of good faith “focus[es] the inquiry on 
the flagrancy of the police misconduct at issue.”94  Moreno believes 
that in Herring, Chief Justice Roberts improperly conflated flagrant 
misconduct with intentional or mentally culpable misconduct.95 
3. New Procedural Impracticalities 
Professor Andrew Ferguson argues that replacing the good faith 
standard with this new subjective culpability standard creates new 
issues to consider for courtroom litigation.96  For example, focusing 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Alschuler, supra note 36, at 486. 
 89. Lafave, supra note 82, at 784 (“The Court has acknowledged that the term 
“gross negligence” can often equate to recklessness.  However, because “gross 
negligence” “is used in Herring to fill out a list into which the term “reckless” had 
already been placed, presumably the term is not being used merely as a synonym for 
recklessness.”); see also supra Section I.A.1. 
 90. Id. at 784–85 (“[I]t presumably refers to a variety of negligence that has an 
effect upon an entire recordkeeping system . . . [b]ut just what is necessary to show 
what the Court referred to as ‘systemic error’ at another point in Herring is far from 
clear.”). 
 91. Moreno, supra note 81, at 49 (“Starting with Herring, a majority of the Court 
transformed the operative constitutional language by inserting a single ambiguous 
word into the new suppression standard.”). 
 92. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143 (2009). 
 93. 564 U.S. 229 (2011). 
 94. Id. at 238. 
 95. Moreno, supra note 81, at 51 (“Starting with Herring, the Court has 
repeatedly used the word flagrant when it actually means intentional or mentally 
culpable.”). 
 96. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: 
Questioning the New Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623 (2014) (addressing the 
various issues presented by the Supreme Court’s recent Fourth Amendment 
decisions). 
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on an officer’s subjective knowledge may give the prosecution an 
additional opportunity to bolster its case by allowing the officer to 
testify as to his subjective reasoning.97  Allowing an officer to testify 
as to his subjective belief for why he thought his actions were 
constitutional may sway the Court to focus too much on subjective 
considerations that the defense cannot contradict.98 
Another problem potentially created is that prior experience of the 
officer now becomes relevant under this new standard.99  Previously, 
“past experience was irrelevant to whether the officer acted within 
constitutional restraints.”100  However, as Ferguson notes, under the 
new culpability standard, “[i]f an officer had been disciplined because 
of prior inattention to constitutional restraints, this fact would bear on 
the nature of the constitutional wrong . . . [a]s might be imagined, this 
history of prior conduct will present a real difficulty for courts in 
terms of time, expense, and confusion.”101 
Finally, using a subjective culpability standard may increase the 
defendant’s burden of proof in the context of the good faith 
exception.102  As Professor Kay Levine notes, “[e]vidence of 
malicious or reckless intent is often hard to come by, especially when 
officers are testifying under oath.”103  This new burden of proof 
requirement will likely lead to many fewer applications of the 
exclusionary rule at suppression hearings.104 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Id. at 671. 
 98. Id. at 673 (“Showing a pattern of constitutional practice may counteract the 
defense’s attempt to show a pattern of violations.”). 
 99. Id. at 671. 
 100. Id. at 673. 
 101. Id. 
 102. United States v. De La Torre, 543 F. App’x 827, 830 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that despite defendant’s proof of overbroad search warrant, good faith exception 
applies unless defendant also proved the overbroad warrant resulted from a ‘flagrant 
or deliberate’ violation of rights under Herring); United States v. Guerrero, 500 F. 
App’x 263, 264–65 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that evidence seized pursuant to facially 
invalid warrant is admissible based on Herring because defendant could not prove 
the officer’s conduct was sufficiently culpable). 
 103. Kay L. Levine et al., Evidence Laundering in a Post-Herring World, 
106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627, 644 (2016); see also Herring v. United States, 
555 U.S. 135, 157 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“How is an impecunious 
defendant to make the required showing?”). 
 104. Tom Goldstein, The Surpassing Significance of Herring, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jan. 14, 2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/the-surpassing-significance-of-herring/ 
[https://perma.cc/67ZM-FGN7] (“[T]he Supreme Court today extended the good 
faith exception to ordinary police conduct.”) (“If Herring comes to be cited for the 
proposition that the defendant must affirmatively prove that the officer was reckless 
rather than merely negligent, then the exclusionary rule will apply much, much more 
rarely than it does today.”). 
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4. Unclear Implications for Attenuation 
Scholars also comment on the unprecedented use of the word 
“attenuated” in the Herring opinion.105  The Court used language 
three different times that suggested that its holding might be relevant 
to a completely separate exception to the exclusionary rule—the 
attenuation exception.  First, the Court stated that “the error was the 
result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest . . . [and] that 
in these circumstances the jury should not be barred from considering 
all the evidence.”106  Second, in describing the Eleventh Circuit’s 
ruling, the Court then stated that “[b]ecause the error was merely 
negligent and attenuated from the arrest, the Eleventh Circuit 
concluded that the benefit of suppressing the evidence ‘would be 
marginal or nonexistent . . . .’”107  Finally, the Court concluded that 
“[a]n error that arises from nonrecurring and attenuated negligence 
is . . . far removed from the core concerns that led us to adopt the 
rule . . . .”108 
The Court never explained why it used the word attenuated at 
all.109  As Alschuler demonstrates, according to the meaning 
attenuation has had over the last seventy years, “attenuation” had no 
place in the Herring opinion: 
The negligence of the Dale County clerk in Herring was plainly both 
a but-for and a proximate cause of the defendant’s unlawful 
arrest. . . . Nothing whatsoever had happened to “dissipate” or 
“attenuate” his error.  Although the clerk’s error occurred five 
months before Herring’s arrest, the passage of time certainly did not 
“dissipate the taint” or break the causal chain.  To the contrary, 
Dale County’s failure to check its electronic record against its paper 
record during the five-month period might have been regarded as 
aggravating the initial wrong.110 
Accordingly, scholars remain puzzled as to what the Court meant by 
“attenuated” in the Herring opinion.111  However, as the next section 
demonstrates, cases focused on the attenuation exception have begun 
to use language from Herring’s good faith analysis. 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Alschuler, supra note 36, at 478–81. 
 106. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137. 
 107. Id. at 138–39. 
 108. Id. at 144. 
 109. Alschuler, supra note 36, at 478–79. 
 110. Id. at 479. 
 111. Lafave, supra note 82, at 771–76. 
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C. Herring’s Lasting Impact: Utah v. Strieff and the Current State 
of the Attenuation Exception’s Purpose and Flagrancy Factor 
Despite the concerns outlined by scholars in the previous section, 
the Court has continued to rely upon Herring’s controversial 
culpability analysis.112  Specifically, the culpability analysis, 
established in the context of the good faith exception, has been used 
to evaluate the purpose and flagrancy factor of the attenuation 
exception in Utah v. Strieff.113  Section I.C.1 reviews the facts and 
decision of Utah v. Strieff.  Section I.C.2 discusses the dissent’s 
concern that Strieff incentivizes officers to commit illegality.  
Section I.C.3 explains scholars’ concern that equating flagrancy with 
Herring’s culpability standard overly burdens the defendant. 
1. Utah v. Strieff: Facts and Majority Opinion 
In Utah v. Strieff, the Court held that an illegal stop was 
sufficiently attenuated from drug evidence later found on the 
defendant, Edward Strieff.114  In this case, Officer Fackrell had been 
intermittently surveilling a house he suspected of drug activity based 
on an anonymous tip.115  During his surveillance, he observed Edward 
Strieff exiting this house, but he did not know when he entered the 
building or how long he had been there.116  Officer Fackrell stopped 
Strieff—illegally, since he did not possess the requisite reasonable 
suspicion117—and demanded identification information, which led 
him to discover an outstanding arrest warrant for an unrelated traffic 
violation.118  Based on the warrant, Officer Fackrell arrested Strieff 
and searched him incident to the arrest.119  Officer Fackrell 
discovered drug evidence against Strieff during this search.120 
To determine whether the evidence was properly admitted at trial, 
the Court applied the three Brown attenuation factors.121  It first 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240–41 (2011). 
 113. Moreno, supra note 81, at 68 (“The assessment of flagrancy [in Strieff ] was a 
not-so-subtle attempt to map the current Court’s flagrant police abuse suppression 
standard onto preexisting attenuation doctrine.”). 
 114. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2060 (2016). 
 115. Id. at 2059. 
 116. Id. at 2060. 
 117. Id. at 2062 (ruling that the information possessed by Officer Fackrell did not 
rise to the level of reasonable suspicion). 
 118. Id. at 2060. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 2062. 
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declared that the temporal proximity factor favored suppression 
because the time between the illegal stop and discovery of evidence 
was only a few minutes.122  Second, it deemed the outstanding 
warrant an intervening circumstance, which would weigh in favor of 
admission.123  Third, and most significantly, when analyzing the 
purpose and flagrancy factor, the Court implicated Herring’s good 
faith analysis.124 
Instead of assessing the obviousness of the impropriety as was done 
in Brown,125 the Court asked whether Fackrell’s mistakes were more 
than negligent, like in Herring.126  The Court answered by concluding 
that Officer Fackrell’s decision to unlawfully stop Strieff was a “good-
faith mistake” that was “at most negligent.”127  However, the Court 
never explained why it believed a “good faith” determination was 
appropriate in the context of attenuation’s purpose and flagrancy 
factor.  Further, the Court stated that “it is especially significant that 
there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected 
flagrantly unlawful police misconduct.”128  Ultimately, the Court 
found that the evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal 
stop and thus deemed it admissible.129 
2. The Dissents: Strieff Provides Incentive to Commit Misconduct 
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan wrote separately in dissent, 
but both argued that the outcome of Strieff provides police with 
further incentive to commit Fourth Amendment violations.130  Justice 
Sotomayor argued that based on this decision, as long as an 
outstanding warrant exists, the illegality of a search makes no 
difference.131  She specifically discussed how “surprisingly common” 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 2062–63. 
 124. Id. at 2063; see also Goldstein, supra note 104 (“[T]he Supreme Court today 
extended the good faith exception to ordinary police conduct.”). But see Alschuler, 
supra note 36, at 473 (“First, creating a general good faith exception for police 
conduct would be an extraordinary shift in Fourth Amendment law that would 
effectively overrule a ton of cases” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 125. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975) (“The impropriety of the arrest was 
obvious . . . ”). 
 126. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
 127. Id. at 2063. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 2064. 
 130. See id. at 2065–66 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); id. at 2073–74 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Kagan was joined by Justice Ginsburg.  Justice Sotomayor was 
joined by Justice Ginsburg as to all but Part IV of the opinion.  
 131. See id. at 2067 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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outstanding arrest warrants are, and “how these astounding numbers 
of warrants can be used by police to stop people without cause.”132  
Quite powerfully, she opined that “this case tells everyone, white and 
black, guilty and innocent . . . that your body is subject to invasion 
while courts excuse the violation of your rights.”133 
Justice Kagan similarly objected that this outcome incentivizes 
police to commit illegal stops.134  She argued that applying the 
exclusionary rule to the facts of Strieff would have resulted in 
sufficient deterrence benefits.135  She reasoned that an officer who 
believes any evidence he discovers illegally will be inadmissible “is 
likely to think the unlawful stop [is] not worth making.”136  She 
further commented that such effect is “precisely the deterrence the 
exclusionary rule is meant to achieve.”137  The outcome of the Strieff 
decision removes the deterrent benefit of the exclusionary rule as 
long as an outstanding warrant exists: 
So long as the target is one of the many millions of people in this 
country with an outstanding arrest warrant, anything the officer 
finds in a search is fair game for use in a criminal prosecution.  The 
officer’s incentive to violate the Constitution thus increases: From 
here on, he sees potential advantage in stopping individuals without 
reasonable suspicion—exactly the temptation the exclusionary rule 
is supposed to remove.138 
These justices ultimately believe that conduct like Officer 
Fackrell’s should be dis-incentivized.  However, as Justice Sotomayor 
notes, the officer’s incentive to violate the law will remain so long as 
the burden of proof remains on the defendant to prove an officer’s 
subjective culpability.139 
3. Increased Burden of Proof Turns on Flagrancy’s Definition 
Scholars predicted that the Herring culpability standard would 
ultimately result in fewer applications of the exclusionary rule 
because the defendant will have an increased burden to prove that an 
officer acted with the required subjective culpability level.140  
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 2070. 
 134. See id. at 2074 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 135. See id. at 2071–72. 
 136. Id. at 2073. 
 137. Id. at 2073–74. 
 138. Id. at 2074. 
 139. See id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 140. Goldstein, supra note 104. 
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According to Moreno, the outcome of Strieff confirms this prediction, 
in the context of the attenuation exception.141 
The Strieff Court held that “it [was] especially significant that there 
[was] no evidence that Officer Fackrell’s illegal stop reflected 
flagrantly unlawful police conduct.”142  The Court, significantly, 
rejected Strieff’s argument that Officer Fackrell was flagrant by 
concluding that his behavior “was not a suspicionless fishing 
expedition ‘in the hopes that something would turn up.’”143  Moreno 
argues that the facts of Strieff do not support such a conclusion.144  
Moreno points out that Fackrell candidly admitted that he lacked 
sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff.145  Considering 
Fackrell’s other admission, that he wanted to “find out what was 
going on [in] the house,”146 the fact that he did not wait to develop 
reasonable suspicion for a lawful stop suggests to Moreno that “[t]he 
evidence, on its face, cannot support a finding of mere negligence.”147  
Still, Strieff was unable to convince the Court that Fackrell acted 
flagrantly. 
Moreno argued that the Court’s treatment of flagrancy in this case 
equates flagrant conduct with intentional or reckless conduct, just like 
in Herring.148  She believes that Strieff’s treatment of the word 
flagrancy puts an unfair burden on the defense to prove the officer’s 
subjective culpability because “[w]hen flagrancy is defined as a 
hidden mental state it becomes unknowable.”149  She acknowledges 
that proof of subjective culpability is an acceptable burden for the 
prosecution to bear when trying to overcome the presumption of 
innocence in a criminal case.150  However, she argues that applying 
this same “insurmountable burden” to defendants in the context of a 
suppression hearing is inappropriate: 
Searches and seizures are rarely witnessed events, police officers 
characteristically do not disclose to suspects their intent to violate 
the constitution, and police officers who witness illegal police 
conduct are unlikely to be cooperative and forthcoming.  Thus, 
defendants typically must rely on their own first-hand eyewitness 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Moreno, supra note 81, at 46–48. 
 142. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063. 
 143. Id. at 2064 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982)). 
 144. Moreno, supra note 81, at 69. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2072. 
 147. Moreno, supra note 81, at 69. 
 148. Id. at 41–42. 
 149. Id. at 51. 
 150. See id. at 55. 
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accounts of police misconduct, which are necessarily self-serving and 
may also be incomplete or poorly-recalled.151 
II.  LOWER COURT PURPOSE AND FLAGRANCY FACTORS 
Given the issues presented by scholars in the above part, a new 
standard for “flagrancy” must be developed.  Much like the Supreme 
Court shows in Utah v. Strieff, lower courts’ decisions demonstrate 
confusion about how flagrancy is to be defined in the Fourth 
Amendment context.  No formal analysis of different interpretations 
of the purpose and flagrancy factor exists in scholarly writing.  
Accordingly, this section attempts to distinguish three different trends 
of how the purpose and flagrancy factor has been interpreted within 
the attenuation context since Herring.  Each case discussed represents 
a different trend or variation of a trend. 
The courts have treated flagrancy in three general ways.  
Section II.A discusses two cases that expressly equate flagrancy with 
subjective intent.  Section II.B discusses a case that defines flagrancy 
as both an objective and subjective inquiry.  Section II.C explores 
three cases that utilize an objective definition for flagrancy, but still 
consider the officer’s subjective intent as a separate “purpose” 
component. 
A. Flagrancy Equated to Subjective Intent 
Some courts completely abandon the objective approach and 
evaluate the “purpose and flagrancy” factor of the attenuation 
exception based on the officer’s subjective culpability.  These courts 
treat purpose and flagrancy as equivalent, interchangeable concepts 
that depend on the subjective intent of the officer.152  They also tend 
to require the highest levels of mens rea culpability—deliberate or 
intentional—for the final attenuation factor to weigh in favor of 
suppression. 
This approach poses the highest evidentiary hurdle for 
defendants.153  Fourth Amendment case law has historically rejected 
analysis of an officer’s subjective intent, so prosecutors do not ask 
officers questions about their subjective beliefs on direct examination 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that an officer acts with the requisite intent when he “purposely extracts evidence” or 
acts with “flagrant illegality” (citing United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1075 
n.17 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 153. See Moreno, supra note 81, at 69 (noting that proof of intentional or mentally 
culpable police misconduct constitutes a “virtually insurmountable burden of proof”). 
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at a suppression hearing.154  Therefore, while it is theoretically the 
government’s burden to prove attenuation, in practice, the defendant 
often ends up bearing the burden of proof.155  Thus, a defendant 
needs to develop a record with evidence pertaining to officer intent 
through cross examination.156  However, this burden is heavy, 
particularly at the highest level of mens rea culpability.157  An officer 
will rarely admit that his intent was to violate the law or that it was 
improper, and most courts presume that an officer does not possess 
the required culpable intent unless otherwise proven.158  Thus, these 
courts most frequently find in favor of attenuation. 
For example, in United States v. Belt,159 the Fourth Circuit held 
that the state troopers’ intent was not flagrant because the 
circumstances were not coercive enough to convince the court the 
officers had an improper purpose.160  Based on a tip that the 
defendant was making methamphetamines, troopers headed to his 
home intending to conduct a knock-and-talk.161  Instead, when they 
arrived, they noticed the defendant’s eleven-year-old son outside and 
followed him into the defendant’s home; this conduct constituted an 
illegal entry because the defendant did not consent to their entry.162  
Once inside, one trooper asked the defendant for consent to search 
his home, but he refused and said they would need a warrant.163  
Troopers continued questioning him and asked what was worrying 
him.164  The defendant answered that there were “two jars upstairs 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened but It 
Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2016/06/opinion-analysis-the-exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/ 
[https://perma.cc/W8JU-84JK] (noting that although the government bears the 
burden of establishing attenuation, the Court has made clear officer’s intent is 
completely irrelevant to Fourth Amendment violations in recent decades, and thus 
there is usually nothing in the record relevant to officer purpose). See generally 
Moreno, supra note 81. 
 155. See Kerr, supra note 154. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Moreno, supra note 81, at 55. 
 158. See id. 
 159. 609 F. App’x 745 (4th Cir. 2015). 
 160. See id. at 750. 
 161. Id.  Normally, the home is a constitutionally protected area. See Florida v. 
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013).  However, under the knock and talk rule, an officer 
may “approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any 
private citizen may do.’” Id. at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469–70 
(2011)). 
 162. See Belt, 609 F. App’x at 747–48. 
 163. Id. at 747. 
 164. Id. 
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that had been used for something” and explained the jars contained 
“the stuff everyone makes.”165  Based on the information learned, one 
of the troopers left and obtained a search warrant.166  Upon returning, 
the troopers searched the home, and found firearms and items used to 
manufacture methamphetamines.167  The Fourth Circuit held that the 
discovery of the methamphetamine evidence was sufficiently 
attenuated from the illegal entry, noting the troopers did not 
flagrantly violate the law when entering the defendant’s home 
without his consent.168 
Based on the defendant’s seemingly voluntary actions and calm 
demeanor, the court declined to infer that the troopers possessed any 
culpable intent.169  The court openly disagreed with the troopers’ 
decision to follow the young son into the home instead of conducting 
the knock-and-talk.170  However, the court found that because the 
defendant “felt comfortable refusing consent to search the home,” 
and because “the voluntary nature of the discussion between 
defendant and troopers” never changed, no evidence indicated 
intimidating circumstances or that the troopers possessed culpable 
intent.171  Therefore, their illegal entry was not a flagrant violation of 
the law that would warrant suppression, and the evidence was 
properly admitted under the attenuation exception.172 
However, in United States v. Shetler,173 the Ninth Circuit found 
sufficient evidence to determine that the officers’ subjective intent 
was specifically to find evidence against the defendant.  In this case, 
officers had received a tip that the defendant was making 
methamphetamines.174  Officers knocked on his front door, and the 
defendant exited his house and approached them from a side door.175  
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 747–48. 
 168. Id. at 749–50. 
 169. Id. at 750 (“Nothing indicates the troopers acted with an improper purpose.  
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Immediately, the officers handcuffed and detained him.176  The 
officers called into the defendant’s house to get his girlfriend and 
daughter out of the house.177  Once they exited, the officers entered 
the home and conducted a search of the home.178  While the home 
was already being searched, other officers asked the defendant’s 
girlfriend for consent to search the house, which she eventually gave, 
but only after the search had started.179  After witnessing the officers’ 
entry, the defendant was Mirandized and then confessed that he’d 
been manufacturing methamphetamines in his garage.180 
In considering the third prong of the attenuation test, the court said 
the officers’ conduct was flagrant after inferring their improper 
subjective intent from four circumstances.181  First, the officers never 
left the house after performing the illegal search—they stayed in a 
room near the entryway for about twenty-five more minutes.182  
Second, they searched the house before asking the defendant’s 
girlfriend for consent to enter and search their home.183  Third, 
officers remained inside the house while others obtained the 
girlfriend’s (tainted) consent.184  Fourth, the court assumed the 
officers specifically used the items they illegally seized when 
questioning the defendant.185  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
the purpose of the officers’ subsequent illegal searches was 
“indisputably to find evidence that could be used against the 
defendant.”186  Because of this improper purpose, the officers’ actions 
were determined to be flagrant, the attenuation exception did not 
apply, and the defendant’s inculpatory statements were suppressed.187 
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B. Flagrancy Depends on Objective Reasonableness and  
Subjective Intent 
Some courts apply both an objective standard and a subjective 
standard to the purpose and flagrancy factor of the attenuation 
exception.  These courts use both objective and subjective standards 
to define flagrancy.188  These courts first consider whether the officer 
acted in “objective good faith.”  Second, they consider whether the 
officer had the specific intent required to justify exclusion. 
For example, in McDaniel v. Polley,189 the Seventh Circuit decided 
the officers’ actions were not flagrant for both objective and 
subjective reasons.  In this case, four officers went to the defendant’s 
house in a murder investigation, knowing they did not yet have 
probable cause to arrest the defendant.190  The defendant consented 
to their requests to enter and to search his home.191  The defendant 
then began acting nervously, so the officers cuffed him but informed 
him he was not under arrest.192  After the officers uncuffed him, the 
defendant agreed to the officers’ request to go to the station.193  The 
defendant was then Mirandized and questioned three separate times 
over twenty-four hours.194  He confessed to murder and signed a 
written confession.195  The trial court concluded that the officers 
unlawfully placed the defendant in custody by handcuffing him.196  
However, the Seventh Circuit held that the confession was sufficiently 
attenuated from the original illegal arrest, and therefore the 
confession was admissible.197 
In evaluating what it called the “flagrancy” factor of the 
attenuation analysis,198 the Seventh Circuit made two determinations.  
First, the court determined whether the officers’ mistake of arresting 
                                                                                                                 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 2003) (requiring a 
showing of objective “bad faith” and subjective intent to commit misconduct without 
probable cause in order to tip the entire final attenuation factor towards 
suppression). 
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misconduct.”) (citing United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 464–65 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
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the defendant (when placing the cuffs on him) without probable cause 
was made in good faith.199  The court said it was, because the mistake 
was merely negligent.200  Second, the Seventh Circuit determined that 
the officers’ subjective intent was not culpable.201  The court 
suggested that the officers only would have been sufficiently culpable 
if they subjectively intended to arrest the defendant when placing the 
cuffs on him.202  Here, they did not.203  Therefore, based on both 
objective and subjective determinations, the Seventh Circuit held that 
the officers’ placement of the cuffs on the defendant was not 
flagrant.204  Excluding the confession, according to the court, “would 
not deter this type of conduct: officers would still have to investigate 
crimes before they have probable cause and would continue to rely on 
various witnesses’ and suspects’ consent when doing so.”205 
C. Flagrancy Depends on Objective Reasonableness, and Purpose 
Depends on Subjective Culpability 
Some courts treat flagrancy as an entirely objective consideration 
based on the clarity of existing case law.  These courts consider an 
officer’s conduct flagrant if it violates case law that is sufficiently clear 
and thus should be known by a reasonably trained officer.  This 
standard is objective because it does not require determining whether 
the officer subjectively knows his conduct is illegal when committing 
it, but rather it requires determining whether the officer should have 
known it was illegal, based on how clear case law is concerning the 
particular act.  However, while flagrancy remains an objective 
determination, the officer’s subjective intent still affects the 
attenuation analysis.  The “purpose” portion of the flagrancy and 
purpose factor is still treated as a subjective consideration that is 
analyzed separately from the flagrancy determination.206 
For example, in United States v. Fuller,207 the court evaluated 
“flagrancy” under an objective standard and separately analyzed 
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negligence.”). 
 200. Id. at 896–97. 
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“purpose” under a subjective standard.  In this case, two officers—
Officers Montgomery and Corrie—stopped the defendant for 
questioning, subjectively “seeking to execute an outstanding arrest 
warrant” against a man that Officer Montgomery confused with the 
defendant.208  Officer Montgomery realized that the defendant was 
not the person he was looking for, but he continued to detain 
Fuller.209  At this point, reasonable suspicion was removed.210  
However, the officers illegally detained the defendant anyway to 
determine whether any outstanding warrants existed in his name.211  
Officer Montgomery attempted to do a pat-down search, but the 
defendant refused, and eventually fled on foot.212  The officers caught 
the defendant, subdued him, and discovered a loaded handgun.213  
The court ruled that the discovery of the handgun was not sufficiently 
attenuated from the unlawfully continued detention of the 
defendant.214 
First, the court stated “[t]he purposefulness factor is met when the 
unlawful action is investigatory, that is, when officers unlawfully seize 
a defendant ‘in the hope something might turn up.’”215  Here, the 
court found that the officers possessed such intent.216  Even though 
the informed officer knew that the defendant was not the man they 
were looking for, he conceded that he wanted to see if there was an 
outstanding warrant.217  However, Officer Montgomery had been 
directly involved with the defendant’s prior criminal case, meaning 
that he should have been fully aware that the defendant no longer 
had any outstanding arrest warrants.218  While the court ruled it was 
relevant to consider whether “the illegal conduct was calculated ‘to 
cause surprise, fright, and confusion,’” it concluded that “purposeful 
                                                                                                                 
 208. Id. at 672. 
 209. Id. at 674. 
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and flagrant misconduct is not limited to situations where the police 
act in an outright threatening or coercive manner.”219 
The court said that “[a]n officer’s conduct is flagrant if it violates 
well-established legal rules.”220  The court found Officer 
Montgomery’s conduct flagrant because he “violated the long-settled 
rule that a police officer must end a Terry stop221 as soon as his 
reasonable suspicion evaporates.”222  The court concluded that 
Officer Montgomery “should have been aware that there was no 
warrant outstanding” for the defendant, and he, thus, should have 
communicated that to his fellow officer.223  The officers continued the 
stop nonetheless.  The court characterized Officer Montgomery’s 
decision to continue the Terry stop as “especially reckless”224 
because, given his involvement in the defendant’s previous criminal 
case, he should have known that the defendant had no outstanding 
arrest warrant.225  This comment emphasizes the objective nature of 
the flagrancy factor because it demonstrates that the court does not 
require the officer to have subjectively known that he was violating 
the law.  Accordingly, the officer’s continued detention of the 
defendant, which he conceded was to investigate whether an 
outstanding warrant existed, was flagrant.226  Therefore, in this case, 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Id. at 689 (first quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975); and then 
quoting United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 630 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
 220. Id. 
 221. A “Terry stop” is another way to describe a regular stop.  Under Terry v. 
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requirements of an arrest or search.  It is only valid when it is justified by an objective 
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 222. Fuller, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 689. 
 223. See id. 
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 225. Id. at 689–90 (“[L]ong before Deputy Montgomery encountered Fuller on 
Wiard Boulevard, the Prosecuting Attorney had both charged Fuller with assault and 
battery and dismissed that charge.  Deputy Montgomery was the officer in charge of 
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witnesses; serving subpoenas on the witnesses; and attending certain court 
proceedings.  And although Deputy Montgomery claims that he has no memory of 
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to believe that Deputy Montgomery did, in fact, serve a witness subpoena in that 
case—which should have signaled to Deputy Montgomery that Fuller’s criminal case 
was in process and that no warrant was outstanding.  Yet Deputy Montgomery had 
no idea that the charges against Fuller had been dismissed several months before he 
encountered Fuller on Wiard Boulevard in October of 2014.  Deputy Montgomery’s 
abject failure to learn and remember the status of his own recent case led him to 
violate Fuller’s Fourth Amendment rights.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 226. Id. at 689. 
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the purpose and flagrancy factor leaned toward exclusion, and the 
handgun was ruled inadmissible.227 
However, the outcome of United States v. Cantu228 demonstrates 
that a defendant’s failure to prove an officer’s subjective culpability 
will outweigh an objective finding of flagrancy and lead to attenuation 
instead of suppression.  In this case, the defendant’s boyfriend gave 
the officers his consent to search his car, in which the officers found a 
purse.229  One officer asked the defendant if the purse belonged to 
her, and she said yes.230  Despite not asking for consent, the officer 
then searched her bag and found marijuana and rolling paper.231  
When asked, the defendant confirmed they were hers.232  The officer 
arrested her and told her she could help herself out if she knew of 
narcotics in the vehicle, and she said she believed there might be.233  
A canine searched the car and led the officers to find a substantial 
amount of cocaine underneath the front seat.234  DEA agents were 
notified and then conducted their own interrogation of the 
defendant.235  At the end of the interrogation, the defendant 
confessed to the cocaine in the car.236 
The court first determined flagrancy based on the objective 
consideration of how clear the case law was concerning these factual 
circumstances.237  The court determined that the precedent laid down 
by the court in United States v. Jaras,238 which held that mere 
acquiescence cannot be construed as voluntary consent when officers 
never asked permission, was longstanding enough that a reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 227. See id. at 690. 
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 238. 86 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996).  In Jaras, police obtained consent for a search 
from the driver of a vehicle, leading them to two suitcases in the trunk. Id. at 386.  
The driver informed the officers that the suitcases belonged to his passenger, Jaras. 
Id.  The officers told Jaras that they obtained permission from the driver to search 
the car. Id.  They continued to open the suitcases without obtaining Jaras’s explicit 
consent to the search. Id.  The court held that the driver’s consent to the car did not 
apply to his passenger’s property. Id. at 389–90.  The court emphasized that Jaras’s 
“mere acquiescence” did not count as voluntary consent to search his belongings, 
particularly because the officers failed to ask for permission. Id. at 390. 
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officer would be aware of it and not violate it.239  Therefore, the 
officer in this case should have been aware of it and not violated it.240  
Because he did violate it, he acted flagrantly when searching the 
defendant’s bag.241 
Second, the court determined that the officer was not subjectively 
culpable.242  Specifically, the court did not believe the officer 
subjectively intended to elicit the defendant’s confession to the 
cocaine by illegally searching her bag.243  While stating that the officer 
who searched the defendant’s purse was flagrant in doing so, the 
court ultimately concluded that the illegal search of the purse was still 
sufficiently attenuated from the discovery of the cocaine because 
“[n]othing suggests that [the officer] searched [the defendant]’s bags 
to gain leverage to exact her confession to other drugs in the car, nor 
did his discovery that she had possession of a small quantity of 
marijuana compel her to confess to possession of a large quantity of 
cocaine when it was later found.”244  The court afforded the officer’s 
lack of subjective culpability more weight than it afforded its own 
finding of flagrancy.  Accordingly, the court found in favor of 
attenuation.245 
In United States v. Gross,246 the Sixth Circuit similarly separated 
purpose from flagrancy.  Flagrancy again depended on the clarity of 
case law.  Purpose, however, did not require specific intent from the 
officer to be sufficiently culpable to justify exclusion, as it did in 
Fuller.  Rather, the court required subjective awareness of the 
illegality, a slightly lower level of culpability.247 
In Gross, an officer noticed a legally parked car with the defendant 
sitting in the passenger seat.248  The officer ran the license plate of the 
car and found no arrest warrants in the car owner’s name.249  Still, the 
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406. 
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officer exited his vehicle and approached the car, asking what the 
defendant was doing.250  He responded that he had been over at his 
girlfriend’s house.251  During the conversation, the officer noticed a 
“partially consumed bottle of Remy Martin cognac.”252  After being 
asked several times, the passenger verbally identified himself.253  The 
officer ran a warrant check, which revealed the passenger had an 
outstanding felony warrant for carrying a concealed weapon.254  He 
arrested him and searched him at the precinct but could not find a 
gun.255  Shortly after the defendant went to the bathroom, officers 
found a gun there.256  Two months later, the defendant confessed to 
having the gun.257  Ultimately, the confession was admissible under 
the attenuation exception.258 
When evaluating the purpose part of the purpose and flagrancy 
factor, the court held that the officer’s state of mind during the illegal 
investigatory stop was not sufficiently culpable to tilt the purpose half 
of this factor towards suppression.  The court reasoned that the 
officer was not subjectively aware that his conduct was illegal.259  This 
standard did not depend on the officer’s specific intent to engage in 
an arrest or search without probable cause, as it did in Cantu.  Rather, 
it depended on a slightly lower level of culpability: whether he 
subjectively “knew [he] did not have probable cause” to act as he 
did.260  The court inferred that, because he did not “immediately [ask] 
several questions related to criminal activity other than trespassing,” 
                                                                                                                 
 250. Id. at 397. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
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 256. Id. (“Gross entered a restroom pod that obscured Williams’s view of Gross 
from the shoulder down.  A short time later, officers discovered a .380 caliber firearm 
near the toilet that Gross had used.”). 
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 258. Id. at 402. 
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Model Penal Code’s definition of criminal recklessness. 
 260. Id. at 406 (quoting United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2006)). 
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962) (requiring that 
a particular result be the specific intent or “conscious object” of the actor), with id. 
§ 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (requiring that the actor be subjectively aware that his conduct will 
produce a certain result). 
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he must have subjectively thought he was acting within the 
permissible scope of behavior.261 
When evaluating the flagrancy within the overall “purpose and 
flagrancy” factor, the court applied the same objective clarity of case 
law standard as in Cantu and Fuller.262  The court found that the 
officer’s illegal investigatory stop was not flagrant because the belief 
that his conduct constituted a legal consensual encounter was 
reasonable.263  The court reasoned that because the specific case law 
establishing his conduct as an investigatory stop rather than a 
consensual encounter was decided after the events of this case had 
occurred, his mistake was reasonable.264  Therefore, the conduct 
could not have been flagrant.265 
III.  THE NEED TO RETURN TO OBJECTIVITY 
The above cases from the lower courts demonstrate that significant 
disagreement persists regarding how to define flagrant misconduct in 
the attenuation exception.  Herring’s culpability standard lies at the 
heart of this disagreement.  The Court should not have changed 
course in Herring v. United States when it adopted a new culpability-
based standard under the good faith exception.  Similarly, the Court 
should not have transposed this approach in Utah v. Strieff to analyze 
the attenuation exception’s “purpose and flagrancy” factor. 
When an officer’s subjective culpability is considered in the 
purpose and flagrancy factor analysis, the entire attenuation analysis 
suffers because it unjustifiably weighs too heavily against the 
defendant.266  Originally, the prosecution bore the burden of proof in 
demonstrating that discovery of evidence was sufficiently attenuated 
from the officer’s illegality.  However, under the current culpability 
standard, the defense unjustly bears the burden to prove the officer’s 
state of mind when committing an illegal act.267  Further, application 
of this culpability standard results in outcomes that provide incentives 
to commit police misconduct rather than avoid it. 
                                                                                                                 
 261. See Gross, 662 F.3d at 406 (quoting United States v. Williams, 615 F.3d 657, 
670–71 (6th Cir. 2010)). 
 262. Id. at 405–06. 
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decidedly an investigatory stop and not a consensual encounter.”). 
 265. Id. at 406. 
 266. See supra Section I.B.4. 
 267. See supra Section I.C.3. 
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Accordingly, flagrancy should be defined according to an objective 
standard, not a subjective standard.  Specifically, flagrancy of an 
illegal act should depend—as it did in Fuller, Cantu, and Gross—on 
whether a reasonable officer would have committed it, based on 
clarity of case law precedent at the time of the offense.268  However, 
unlike in those three cases, the Court should not require proof of any 
level of subjective culpability.  Flagrancy should be found when an 
officer unreasonably violates the law according to a reasonable officer 
standard.  Further, flagrancy should be the only determination within 
the final attenuation factor—“purpose” should be removed. 
Section III.A evaluates why a subjective culpability standard 
should be rejected and thus why the final attenuation factor should 
depend solely on an objective determination of flagrancy.  
Section III.B demonstrates how an objective flagrancy standard based 
on clarity and longevity of case law could better replace what 
currently exists. 
A. Impracticalities of Subjectivity 
The government is supposed to bear the burden of proof when 
arguing an exception to the exclusionary rule.269  Scholars correctly 
predicted, however, that Herring would lead to a heightened burden 
for the defendant.  Further, scholars also correctly predicted that 
Herring would complete a shift in Fourth Amendment case law to 
include an officer’s subjective state of mind as a relevant factor.  The 
first part of this section addresses the defendant’s heightened burden 
of proof under a subjective standard.  The second part of this section 
shows why this shift in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is 
unnecessary. 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See, e.g., United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 405–06 (6th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Cantu, 426 F. App’x 253, 258 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Fuller, 120 F. 
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well-established legal rules.”). 
 269. See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) 
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defendant alleged the search or seizure was illegal, the burden shifted to the 
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1. Defendant’s Burden Is Too High 
United States v. Cantu 270 demonstrates how the defendant’s 
heightened burden to prove subjective culpability results in an 
improper evidentiary outcome.  The case depended on whether the 
purpose and flagrancy factor weighed in favor of suppression or not.  
The court correctly declared that the officer’s behavior was flagrant 
because the case law pertaining to the officer’s particular behavior 
was perfectly clear and long established.271  However, because the 
defendant could not additionally prove that the officer subjectively 
intended to use the marijuana he illegally found to “exact her 
confession to other drugs in the car . . . ,” the Fifth Circuit deemed he 
was not sufficiently culpable to tip the entire “purpose and flagrancy” 
factor towards exclusion.272 
The Fifth Circuit should not have required the defendant to prove 
the officer’s subjective state of mind at the time of his illegal act.  The 
flagrancy determination alone should have made up the entirety of 
the third attenuation factor.  The only evidence available to the 
defendant pertinent to the officer’s intent at the time of the illegal 
search was what he told the defendant after she was already 
arrested273: that she should “help herself out” and that “if there are 
any more narcotics in the vehicle, you know, and stuff like that we 
should know about, I mean, you should let us know.”274  This 
statement supports the argument that the officer “improperly” 
intended to use his arrest of Cantu—which was based on the 
marijuana—to gain evidence regarding the cocaine.  Still, the court 
was unconvinced.  The outcome of this case demonstrates the 
heightened burden on defendant that is created by inserting a 
subjective culpability consideration into the purpose and flagrancy 
factor. 
The court’s decision in United States v. Belt demonstrates that a 
similar problem occurs when flagrancy is directly equated with proof 
of a subjective state of mind.275  In Belt, the Fourth Circuit 
determined that the officers were not flagrant when illegally following 
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 271. Id. at 257. 
 272. Id. at 258. 
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the defendant’s eleven-year-old-son into defendant’s home276 because 
“[n]othing indicates the troopers acted with an improper purpose.”277  
The court’s assumption that the officers were not trying to use the son 
to gain entry for searching purposes was based on a perceived lack of 
coercion due to the defendant’s calm demeanor.278  However, the 
defendant’s demeanor should not be dispositive of the officer’s 
subjective state of mind.  Furthermore, the court assumed the 
officer’s motives were proper, demonstrating the burden shift that a 
subjective standard produces in practice.  Even though the court 
disagreed with the officer’s decision to follow the son into the 
defendant’s home, because he was not found subjectively culpable, 
the evidence was ultimately admissible. 
2. No Need to Contradict Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Cases such as Shetler, McDaniel v. Polley, Gross, and Fuller 
demonstrate that courts may be able to sometimes achieve the proper 
outcome despite having a partially or fully subjective standard.  
However, a subjective standard still yields improper outcomes, such 
as those in Belt and Cantu.  An objective flagrancy standard would 
achieve the same outcomes in the cases that came out properly, and it 
would also correct the outcomes of cases that came out improperly. 
Accordingly, contradicting case law by applying a subjective 
culpability standard in the third attenuation factor is unnecessary. 
For example, the illegal search of the defendant’s home in Shetler 
was objectively flagrant simply based on clearly and consistently held 
precedent that consent can only be used as an exception to the 
warrant requirement when it is given voluntarily.279  No reasonable 
officer could ever conclude that the consent given by the defendant’s 
girlfriend under the circumstances of this case was voluntary.  
Furthermore, her consent was only granted after some of the officers 
                                                                                                                 
 276. This action was illegal because “no reasonable officer would believe that 
Belt’s eleven-year-old child had authority to consent to the officers’ entry into Belt’s 
home, nor does the record establish that the child had actual authority to give such 
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Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).  Further, a larger number of 
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generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & DAVID C. BAUM, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2017). 
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had already illegally entered the defendant’s home.280  This conduct 
would have been objectively flagrant and would have tipped the 
flagrancy factor in favor of suppression just the same, without 
requiring the court to make inferences regarding subjective intent. 
Similarly, the continued detention of the defendant in Fuller was 
objectively flagrant based on the long-held principle that a stop is 
only justifiable when reasonable suspicion exists.281  Once Officer 
Montgomery realized that the defendant was not the person he was 
looking for, his reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant no 
longer existed.  A reasonably well-trained officer would have let the 
defendant go after that point.  Accordingly, Officer Montgomery’s 
conduct would have been deemed flagrant under an entirely objective 
standard (as it was in the case).282 
Cases like Gross and McDaniel v. Polley each demonstrate 
situations where the officer was not acting objectively flagrantly, and 
therefore applying the attenuation exception was appropriate.  In 
Gross, the court expressly conceded that “it was not until . . . [United 
States v. See283], decided after the events in this case, that it would 
have been clear to [the officer] that his methods were decidedly an 
investigatory stop and not a consensual encounter.”284  Accordingly, 
the court acknowledged that case law was not sufficiently clear at the 
time of the questionable behavior for a reasonable officer to have 
known that it was unconstitutional, and thus, his behavior was not 
flagrant.285 
In McDaniel v. Polley, the conduct at issue was whether placing 
handcuffs on a defendant while telling him he was not under arrest 
actually qualifies as an arrest.286  Applying an objective flagrancy 
standard based on clarity of case law, this conduct would not be 
considered flagrant.  Case law is not entirely clear as to when a police 
encounter escalates to an “arrest.”  The standard currently applied by 
the courts to determine whether conduct constitutes an arrest is 
whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave.287  The lower 
court concluded that handcuffing the defendant constituted an 
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arrest,288 but handcuffs do not always mean someone is under 
arrest.289  Therefore, the officer in this case reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an arrest.  He would not be flagrant under 
an objective standard, just as he was not found flagrant under a 
standard considering subjective culpability. 
B. Flagrancy Should Be Based on Clarity of Case Law 
The flagrancy standard applied in Fuller, Cantu, and Gross 
(separate from the purpose factor in those cases) solves the above 
problems that the subjective approach creates because it is an entirely 
objective standard.  Whether a violation is flagrant or not should 
depend on whether case law clearly and consistently has established 
the constitutionality of the conduct in question. 
1. Burden Properly Relieved 
Applying an objective flagrancy standard based on clarity of case 
law will return the defendant’s burden of proof at the suppression 
hearing to its proper level.290  The government is supposed to bear the 
burden of proof when arguing an exception to the exclusionary 
rule.291  However, currently, most courts presume an officer’s 
subjective intent to be legal until proven otherwise.292  Accordingly, 
the current Herring flagrancy standard requires the defendant to find 
evidence of the officer’s subjective state of mind.293  Because the 
testimony of an officer will rarely include evidence of intent, the 
defendant is at a severe disadvantage because all he has are his first-
hand observations of the officer’s conduct.294  Such evidence only 
circumstantially demonstrates an officer’s intent and requires courts 
to make speculative inferences, which they are loathe to do.295 
In Utah v. Strieff, the defendant’s burden of proof would have 
been significantly relieved if the Court determined flagrancy under an 
objective standard based on clarity of case law precedent.  In Strieff, 
the government only had one statement regarding the officer’s 
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purpose.296  At the suppression hearing, when asked why he stopped 
Strieff, Fackrell replied that Strieff “was coming out of the house” 
that he had been watching and he wanted to “find out what was going 
on in the house . . . [and] what Strieff was doing there.”297  The Court 
decided, within the purpose and flagrancy factor of the attenuation 
analysis, that Fackrell’s decision was a “good faith” mistake.298  It 
remains unclear how this generic statement that he wanted to 
investigate the case met the government’s burden to show good 
faith.299  Still, the Court found the officer’s conduct was not 
flagrant.300 
However, a flagrancy standard like that in Fuller, Cantu, or Gross 
(but not including the separate “purpose” consideration) would have 
yielded a different—and appropriate—outcome.  The only burden 
would be to discern the clarity of case law surrounding stops, 
particularly whether a reasonable officer would know that without 
seeing when someone leaves a suspected drug house, he does not 
have the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the individual.301  In 
Utah v. Strieff, a reasonable officer would have known he did not 
have enough evidence to stop the individual.302  Thus, the officer’s 
conduct was flagrant, and the flagrancy factor of the attenuation 
analysis would favor suppression. 
2. Court Can Choose What It Wants to Dis-Incentivize 
Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg were concerned that the 
outcome of Strieff would incentivize officers to commit future 
illegalities.303  Applying an objective flagrancy standard will allow 
courts to more clearly delineate the behavior that they aim to deter or 
dis-incentivize.  For example, in Belt, even though the court disagreed 
with the troopers’ decision to follow the defendant’s son into the 
home instead of conducting the planned knock and talk, the court 
decided the troopers’ actions were not flagrant.  The dissent, 
however, acknowledged that alternatives were available to them: “the 
officers could easily have knocked on his door, identified themselves, 
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and sought Belt’s consent before entering.”304  Further, the dissent 
highlights that “[t]hese alternatives would have avoided not only 
violating Belt’s Fourth Amendment rights but also the oft-cited safety 
risks involved when officers confront individuals in their homes 
without warning.”305 
Applying a flagrancy standard based on the clarity of case law 
would aim to deter future officers from using a defendant’s child as a 
way around valid consent.  It would incentivize them to choose the 
alternatives that the court highlighted.  Courts handling cases with 
facts similar to those of this case consistently make clear that an 
eleven-year-old son of the defendant under these circumstances 
would not have valid authority to allow officers to enter the 
defendant’s home.306  A reasonably well-trained officer should be 
aware of such precedents.  Therefore, under an objective flagrancy 
standard, officers like those in Belt could be deterred from similar 
conduct in the future if their conduct was deemed flagrant, and the 
attenuation exception had not been applied. 
CONCLUSION 
When subjective intent is considered in analyzing the third 
attenuation factor, the defendant is put at too much of a 
disadvantage.  It is inherently difficult to prove an officer’s intent 
when the record is more often than not devoid of evidence of what 
the officer was thinking.  This consequence is evident in Strieff, where 
the defendant could not prove the officer was sufficiently subjectively 
culpable, and thus the officer’s discovery of an arrest warrant was 
considered an intervening circumstance that severed causation.307  
                                                                                                                 
 304. United States v. Belt, 609 F. App’x 745, 754 (2015) (Wynn, J., dissenting).  
Further, Judge Wynn acknowledged the officers could have “ask[ed] Belt’s son to 
retrieve his father from the home.” Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. See, e.g., Saavedra v. State, 622 So. 2d 952, 959 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the 
accused’s fifteen-year-old son could not provide valid consent for the police to enter 
accused’s home when police had no warrant and had not elicited facts to suggest son 
had authority over premises); State v. Ellis, 210 P.3d 144, 148, 150–53 (Mont. 2009) 
(holding that defendant’s thirteen-year-old daughter could not give valid consent to 
search of father’s residence or her own bedroom). 
 307. In Strieff, the warrant check was perceived as an intervening circumstance, 
and the majority did not seem to view it as a “foreseeable consequence” the same 
way the dissenters did. Compare Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016), with id. 
at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Had the majority viewed Fackrell’s conduct as 
flagrant, it probably would have also believed that the outstanding warrant was a 
foreseeable consequence based on traditional practice and the incredibly high 
amount of outstanding warrants that exist. 
838 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
Therefore, the officer essentially got away with creating his own 
probable cause.  This unfair consequence indicates that subjective 
intent is not an appropriate consideration in the context of flagrancy.  
Such burden inappropriately subverts the justice system’s principle 
that a defendant is “innocent until proven guilty.” 
Further, it is not readily apparent that basing suppression rulings 
on officers’ mens rea actually achieves the Court’s stated goal of 
promoting officer deterrence.  Because of the high burden involved in 
proving subjective culpability, actions that would otherwise be 
deemed flagrant under an objective standard end up being 
categorized as innocent mistakes more often than flagrant 
violations—as was the case in Strieff.  Accordingly, using subjective 
intent to determine admissibility significantly limits the power the 
Court actually has in delineating the kind of conduct it finds 
impermissible.  Instead, using a subjective intent standard provides 
incentive to ignore constitutional limits, as Justices Sotomayor, 
Kagan, and Ginsburg fear. 
Therefore, the best solution is to remove the subjective intent 
analysis completely from the purpose and flagrancy factor.  The new 
final attenuation factor should simply be determining whether the 
officer’s conduct was flagrant.  An officer should be deemed flagrant 
when he violates case law that has been so clear and well-established 
that any reasonably well-trained officer would be aware of it and its 
implications.  Under this standard, the exclusionary rule can avoid 
being further narrowed, the courts will be less burdened, and the 
defendant is actually treated as innocent until proven guilty. 
